In a country that once epitomized political grandeur, France has achieved something remarkable—and not in a good way. Sébastien Lecornu, the nation’s newly appointed prime minister, resigned after just 26 days in office. He didn’t even collect his first paycheck. To put this in perspective, his government lasted a mere 14 hours, barely enough time to brew a pot of coffee and let it go cold.
This isn’t just political theater; it’s a symptom of something far more dangerous. France, the European Union’s second-largest economy, has become ungovernable. And unlike Germany’s industrial struggles or Italy’s historical instability, France’s crisis threatens to metastasize across the entire continent.
The Fall of Macron’s Golden Age
To understand how France arrived at this precipice, we need to rewind to 2017. Emmanuel Macron swept into power as the golden boy of European politics, young, centrist, reformist. His party commanded an overwhelming majority with 350 of 577 parliamentary seats. The future looked bright.
But Macron’s reforms, though economically sound on paper, proved politically toxic. He eliminated the wealth tax, lowered corporate taxes, and eased capital gains taxes, measures that cost the state 2.2% of GDP in revenue. The problem? He didn’t offset these cuts with reduced spending. Soon, the “president of the rich” faced the Yellow Vest protests, a visceral rejection of his agenda compounded by growing concerns over immigration and Islamic radicalism.
His second term tells a different story entirely. In the last legislative elections, Macron’s coalition hemorrhaged 105 seats. The 2024 European elections delivered an even more brutal verdict: Marine Le Pen’s National Rally captured 30 of France’s 81 EU parliamentary seats, becoming the dominant force.
In a desperate gambit, Macron dissolved the National Assembly and called snap elections, forging a tacit alliance with the leftist New Popular Front to contain Le Pen’s surge. The strategy worked, partially. He stopped the nationalist right from seizing power, but at the cost of sacrificing his own political relevance. His party ceased to be the leading force, and the new parliamentary arithmetic made stable governance nearly impossible.
The Ungovernable Republic
Since the elections, France has cycled through prime ministers like a carousel. Lecornu is already the fifth of Macron’s second term and the third in 2024 alone. His predecessor, François Bayrou, lasted slightly longer but still fell to a no-confidence vote. Before him, Michel Barnier attempted to pass a budget using Article 49.3, a constitutional provision allowing the government to bypass parliamentary approval, only to be toppled by an unlikely alliance between Mélenchon’s far-left and Bardella’s far-right.
Lecornu promised to break with Macronism, build consensus, and avoid the nuclear option of Article 49.3. He presented a softer budget and abandoned unpopular measures like suspending public holidays. Yet he made a fatal error: of his 18 ministers, 12 were Macron loyalists. The supposed fresh start looked suspiciously like more of the same.
The final blow came not from the left but from the Republicans, the moderate right-wing party that was supposed to be his natural ally. They pulled their support after Lecornu appointed two former party members who had defected to Macron years earlier. Even calculated political partnerships have their limits.
The Real Sun King: France’s Bloated State
But France’s paralysis isn’t just about personalities or tactical mistakes. It’s rooted in something more fundamental: the French state controls 57% of GDP, making it the largest government footprint in the developed world outside of microstates and monarchies. Even Nordic social democracies look libertarian by comparison.
This leviathan is powered primarily by one constituency: retirees. Pensions alone consume a quarter of the government budget, 14% of GDP. French retirees receive 30% more than their British counterparts and collect benefits for 25% longer. Add healthcare spending and supplementary pensions, and the elderly claim another fifth of the national budget.
Here’s the kicker: 45% of the increase in French government spending since World War II can be explained by pensions alone. Yet when Macron tried to raise the retirement age from 62 to 64, Paris erupted. And who set those trash cans ablaze? Not octogenarians, it was young people defending a system that increasingly taxes them to fund previous generations.
The Fiscal Time Bomb
France finances this largesse through borrowing. Despite having some of the world’s highest taxes, the country runs a deficit of around 6% of GDP. While Italy reduced its deficit from 8% to 3% post-pandemic, France increased its from 4.75% to nearly 6%, all while the economy barely limps along at 1% growth (projected to fall to 0.6% this year).
The markets have noticed. French 10-year bonds now trade at yields comparable to Italian bonds, a humiliating development for a nation that once anchored European financial stability. Credit rating agency Fitch downgraded France, and borrowing costs continue climbing. Every day, more of the budget gets consumed by interest payments, creating a vicious cycle.
No Easy Exits
Macron faces an impossible trilemma. He could dissolve the Assembly again, but another election might deliver Le Pen’s National Rally to power. Would markets tolerate a populist government promising to maintain or expand the welfare state? Doubtful. A fiscal crisis would follow, forcing precisely the reforms Le Pen’s base opposes.
Alternatively, Macron could compromise with the moderate left and form a government. But the Socialists won’t accept his pension reforms, and without addressing the structural deficit, France merely delays the inevitable reckoning.
The third option, continuing as is, means prolonged paralysis, rising borrowing costs, and a slow-motion crisis that could eventually engulf the eurozone.
Europe’s New Sick Man
France has become Italy, but worse. At least Italy under Giorgia Meloni has achieved something resembling political stability. During her tenure, France has burned through five prime ministers, with a sixth likely on the way.
The stakes extend far beyond French borders. When Greece needed a bailout in 2012, it accounted for just 2% of EU GDP. France represents roughly 17%. A full-blown French fiscal crisis wouldn’t just ripple through Europe, it would trigger a continental earthquake.
The question isn’t whether France needs reform; everyone knows it does. The question is whether any political configuration can deliver it. Right now, the answer appears to be no. Every faction, left, right, and center, prefers the comfortable fiction that France can maintain its generous social model without painful adjustments.
Perhaps French institutions are resilient enough to weather this storm. Perhaps market pressure will eventually force politicians to act. Or perhaps we’re witnessing the slow-motion collapse of Europe’s second pillar. One thing is certain: France can’t afford many more 26-day governments before something breaks.
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